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1 Introduction
Formal models allow us to make verbal notions operational and confront them with data.
The Schumpeterian growth theory surveyed in this paper has operationalizedSchumpeters
notion of creative destruction -the process by which new innovations replace older technologies-
, in two ways. First, it has developed models based on creative destruction that shed new light
on several aspects of the growth process. Second, it has used data, including rich micro data,
to confront the predictions that distinguish it from other growth theories. In the process, the
theory has improved our understanding of the underlying sources of growth.
Over the past 25 years,1 Schumpeterian growth theory has developed into an integrated
framework for understanding not only the macroeconomic structure of growth but also the
many microeconomic issues regarding incentives, policies and organizations that interact with
growth: who gains and who loses from innovations, and what the net rents from innovation
are, these ultimately depend upon characteristics such as property right protection, compe-
tition and openness, education, democracy....and to a di¤erent extent in countries or sectors
at di¤erent stages of development. Moreover, the recent years have witnessed a new genera-
tion of Schumpeterian growth models focusing on rm dynamics and reallocation of resources
among incumbents and new entrants.2 These models are easily estimable using micro rm-level
datasets which also brings the rich set of tools from other empirical elds into macroeconomics
and endogenous growth.
In this paper, which aims at being accessible to readers with only basic knowledge in eco-
nomics and is thus largely self-contained, we shall consider four aspects on which Schumpeterian
growth theory delivers distinctive predictions.3 First, the relationship between growth and in-
dustrial organization: faster innovation-led growth is generally associated with higher turnover
rates, i.e. higher rates of creation and destruction, of rms and jobs; moreover, competition
appears to be positively correlated with growth, and competition policy tends to complement
patent policy. Second, the relationship between growth and rm dynamics: small rms exit
more frequently than large rms; conditional on survival, small rms grow faster; there is a
very strong correlation between rm size and rm age; nally, rm size distribution is highly
skewed. Third, the relationship between growth and development with the notion of appropri-
ate institutions: namely, the idea that di¤erent types of policies or institutions appear to be
growth-enhancing at di¤erent stages of development. Our emphasis will be on the relationship
between growth and democracy, and on why this relationship appears to be stronger in more
frontier economies. Four, the relationship between growth and long-term technological waves:
why such waves are associated with an increase in the ow of rm entry and exit; why they
may initially generate a productivity slowdown; and why they may increase wage inequality
1The approach was initiated in the fall of 1987 at MIT, where Philippe Aghion was a rst-year assistant
professor and Peter Howitt a visiting professor on sabbatical from the University of Western Ontario. During
that year they wrote their "model of growth through creative destruction" (see Section 2 below) which came
out as Aghion and Howitt (1992). Parallel attempts at developing Schumpeterian growth models, include
Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990) and Corriveau (1991).
2See Klette and Kortum (2004), Lentz and Mortensen (2008), Akcigit and Kerr (2010), and Acemoglu,
Akcigit, Bloom and Kerr (2012)
3Thus we are not looking at the aspects or issues that could be addressed by the Schumpeterian model and
also by other models, including Romer (1990)s product variety model (see Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2009)).
Grossman and Helpman (1991) were rst to point at parallels between the two models, although using a special
version of the Schumpeterian model.
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both between and within educational groups. In each case we show that Schumpeterian growth
theory delivers predictions that distinguishes it from other growth models and which can be
tested using micro data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic Schumpeterian model.
Section 3 introduces competition and IO into the framework. Section 4 analyzes rm dynamics.
Section 5 looks at the relationship between growth and development and in particular at the
role of democracy in the growth process. Section 6 discusses technological waves. Section 7
concludes.
A word of caution before we proceed: this paper focuses on the Schumpeterian Growth
paradigm and some of its applications, it is not a survey of the existing (endogenous) growth
literature. There, we refer the reader to growth textbooks (e.g. Acemoglu (2009), Aghion and
Howitt (1998, 2009), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), Galor (2011), Jones and Vollrath (2013),
and Weil (2012)).
2 Schumpeterian growth: basic model
2.1 The setup
The following model borrows directly from the theoretical IO and patent race literatures (see
Tirole (1988)). This model is Schumpeterian in that: (i) it is about growth generated by inno-
vations; (ii) innovations result from entrepreneurial investments that are themselves motivated
by the prospects of monopoly rents; (iii) new innovations replace old technologies: in other
words, growth involves creative destruction.
Time is continuous and the economy is populated by a continuous mass L of innitely lived
individuals with linear preferences, and which discount the future at rate :4 Each individual
is endowed with one unit of labor per unit of time, which she can allocate between production
and research: in equilibrium, individuals are indi¤erent between these two activities.
There is a nal good, which is also the numeraire. Final good at time t is produced
competitively using an intermediate input, namely:
Yt = Aty

t
where  is between zero and one, yt is the amount of intermediate good currently used in
the production of nal good, and At is the productivity -or quality- of the currently used
intermediate input.5
The intermediate good y is in turn produced one for one with labor: that is, one unit ow of
labor currently used in manufacturing the intermediate input, produces one unit of intermediate
input of frontier quality. Thus yt denotes both, the current production of intermediate input
and the ow amount of labor currently employed in manufacturing the intermediate good.
Growth in this model results from innovations that improve the quality of the intermediate
input used in the production of the nal good. More formally, if the previous state-of-the-art
intermediate good was of quality A; then a new innovation will introduce a new intermediate
input of quality A; where  > 1: This immediately implies that growth will involve creative
4The linear preferences (or risk neutrality) assumption implies that the equilibrium interest rate will always
be equal to the rate of time preference: rt =  (see Aghion and Howitt (2009), Chapter 2).
5 In what follows we will use the words "productivity" or "quality" indi¤erently.
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destruction, in the sense that Bertrand competition will allow the new innovator to drive the
rm producing intermediate good of quality A out of the market, since at the same labor cost
the innovator produces a better good than that of incumbent rm.6
The innovation technology is directly drawn from the theoretical IO and patent race liter-
atures: namely, if zt units of labor are currently used in R&D, then a new innovation arrives
during the current unit of time at the (memoriless) Poisson rate zt:7 Henceforth we will drop
the time index t, when it causes no confusion.
2.2 Solving the model
2.2.1 The research arbitrage and labor market clearing equations
We shall concentrate attention to balanced growth equilibria where the allocation of labor
between production (y) and R&D (z) remains constant over time. The growth process is
described by two basic equations.
The rst is the labor market clearing equation:
L = y + z (L)
reecting the fact that the total ow of labor supply during any unit of time is fully absorbed
between production and R&D activities (i.e. by the demands for manufacturing and R&D
labor).
The second equation reects individuals indi¤erence in equilibrium between engaging in
R&D or working in the intermediate good sector. We call it the research arbitrage equation.
The remaining part of the analysis consists in spelling out this research arbitrage equation.
More formally, let wk denote the current wage rate conditional on there having already
been k 2 Z++ innovations from time 0 until current time t (since innovation is the only source
of change in this model, all other economic variables remain constant during the time interval
between two successive innovations): And let Vk+1 denote the net present value of becoming
the next ((k + 1) -th) innovator.
During a small time interval dt, between the k-th and (k+1) -th innovations, an individual
faces the following choice. Either she employs her (ow) unit of labor for the current unit of
time in manufacturing at the current wage, in which case she gets wtdt: Or she devotes her
ow unit of labor to R&D, in which case she will innovate during the current time period with
6Thus overall, growth in the Schumpeterian model involves both, positive and negative externalities. The
positive externality is referred to by Aghion and Howitt (1992) as a "knowledge spillover e¤ect": namely, any
new innovation raises productivity A forever, i.e the benchmark technology for any subsequent innovation;
however the current (private) innovator captures the rents from her innovation only during the time interval
until the next innovation occurs. This e¤ect is also featuring in Romer (1990) where it is referred to instead as
"non-rivalry plus limited excludability". But in addition, in the Schumpeterian model, any new innovation has
a negative externality as it destroys the rents of the previous innovator: following the theoretical IO literature,
Aghion and Howitt (1992) refer to this as the "business-stealing e¤ect" of innovation. The welfare analysis in
that paper derives su¢ cient conditions under which the intertemporal spillover e¤ect dominates or is dominated
by the business-stealing e¤ect. The equilibrium growth rate under laissez-faire is correspondingly suboptimal
or excessive compared to the socially optimal growth rate.
7More generally, if zt units of labor are invested in R&D during the time interval [t; t+ dt]; the probability
of innovation during this time interval is ztdt:
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probability dt and then get Vk+1, whereas she gets nothing if she does not innovate.8 The
research arbitrage equation is then simply expressed as:
wk = Vk+1: (R)
The value Vk+1 is in turn determined by a Bellman equation. We will use Bellman equations
repeatedly in this survey, thus it is worth going slowly here. During a small time interval dt;
a rm collects k+1dt prots. At the end of this interval, it is replaced by a new entrant with
probability zdt through creative destruction, otherwise it preserves the monopoly power and
Vk+1. Hence the value function is written as
Vk+1 = k+1dt+ (1  rdt)

zdt 0
(1  zdt) Vk+1

Dividing both sides by dt, then taking the limit as dt ! 0 and using the fact that the equi-
librium interest rate is equal to the time preference, the Bellman equation for Vk+1 can be
rewritten as:
Vk+1 = k+1   zVk+1:
In other words: the annuity value of a new innovation (i.e. its ow value during a unit of
time) is equal to the current prot ow k+1 minus the expected capital loss zVk+1 due to
creative destruction, i.e. to the possible replacement by a subsequent innovator. If innovating
gave the innovator access to a permanent prot ow k+1; then we know that the value of the
corresponding perpetuity would be k+1=r:9 However, there is creative destruction at rate z:
As a result, we have:
Vk+1 =
k+1
+ z
; (1)
that is, the value of innovation is equal to the prot ow divided by the risk-adjusted interest
rate + z where the risk is that of being displaced by a new innovator.
2.2.2 Equilibrium prots, aggregate R&D and growth
We solve for equilibrium prots k+1 and the equilibrium R&D rate z by backward induction.
That is, rst, for given productivity of the current intermediate input, we solve for the equi-
librium prot ow of the current innovator; then we move one step back and determine the
equilibrium R&D using equations (L) and (R).
8Note that we are implicitly assuming that previous innovators are not candidates for being new innovators.
This in fact results from a replacement e¤ect pointed out by Arrow (1962). Namely, an outsider goes from
zero to Vk+1 if she innovates, whereas the previous innovator would go from Vk to Vk+1: Given that the R&D
technology is linear, if outsiders are indi¤erent betwen innovating and working in manufacturuing then incumbent
innovators will strictly prefer to work in manufacturing. Thus new innovations end up being made by outsiders
in equilibrium of this model. This feature will be relaxed in the next section.
9 Indeed, the value of the perpetuity is:
1Z
0
k+1e
 rtdt =
k+1
r
:
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Equilibrium prots Suppose that kt innovations have already occurred until time t, so that
the current productivity of the state-of-the-art intermediate input is Akt = 
kt . Given that
the nal good production is competitive, the intermediate good monopolist will sell her input
at a price equal to its marginal product, namely
pk(y) =
@(Aky
)
@y
= Aky
 1: (2)
This is the inverse demand curve faced by the intermediate good monopolist.
Given that inverse demand curve, the monopolist will choose y to
k = max
y
fpk(y)y   wkyg subject to (2) (3)
since it costs wky units of numeraire to produce y units of intermediate good. Given the
Cobb-Douglas technology for the production of nal good, the equilibrium price is a constant
markup over the marginal cost (pk = wk=) and the prot is simply equal to 1  times the
wage bill, namely:
k =
1  

wky (4)
where y solves (3).
Equilibrium aggregate R&D Combining (1) ; (4) and (R), we can rewrite the research
arbitrage equation as:
wk = 
1 
 wk+1y
+ z
: (5)
Using the labor market clearing condition (L) and the fact that on a balanced growth path all
aggregate variables (the nal output ow, prots and wages) are multiplied by  each time a
new innovation occurs, we can solve (5) for the equilibrium aggregate R&D z as a function of
the parameters of the economy:
z =
1 
 L  
1 + 1  
: (6)
Clearly it is su¢ cient to assume that 1  L >

 to ensure positive R&D in equilibrium.
Inspection of (6) delivers a number of important comparative statics. In particular a higher
productivity of the R&D technology as measured by  or higher size of innovations  or a higher
size of the population L have a positive e¤ect on aggregate R&D. On the other hand a higher
 (which corresponds to the intermediate producer facing a more elastic inverse demand curve
and therefore getting lower monopoly rents) or a higher discount rate  tend to discourage
R&D.
Equilibrium expected growth Once we have determined the equilibrium aggregate R&D,
it is easy to compute the expected growth rate. First note that during a small time interval
[t; t+ dt]; there will be a successful innovation with probability zdt: Second, the nal output
is multiplied by  each time a new innovation occurs. Therefore the expected output is simply:
lnYt+dt = zdt ln Yt + (1  zdt) lnYt:
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Subtracting lnYt from both sides, dividing through dt and nally taking the limit leads to the
following expected growth
E (gt) = lim
dt!0
lnYt+dt   lnYt
dt
= z ln 
which inherits the comparative static properties of z with respect to the parameters ; ; ; ;
and L:
A distinct prediction of the model is:
Prediction 0: The turnover rate z is comonotonic with the growth rate g.
3 Growth meets IO
Empirical studies (starting with Nickell (1996), Blundell, Gri¢ th and Van Reenen (1995, 1999))
point to a positive correlation between growth and product market competition. Also, the idea
that competition - or free entry- should be growth-enhancing, is also prevalent among policy
advisers. Yet, non-Schumpeterian growth models cannot account for it: AK models assume
perfect competition and therefore have nothing to say on the relationship between competition
and growth; and in Romers product variety model, higher competition amounts to higher
degree of substitutability between the horizontally di¤erentiated inputs, which in turn implies
lower rents for innovators and therefore lower R&D incentives and thus lower growth.
In contrast, the Schumpeterian growth paradigm can rationalize the positive correlation
between competition and growth found in linear regressions. In addition, it can account for
several interesting facts about competition and growth which no other growth theory can
explain.10 We shall concentrate on three such facts. First, innovation and productivity growth
by incumbent rms appear to be stimulated by competition and entry particularly in rms
near the technology frontier or in rms that compete "neck-and-neck" with their rivals, less so
in rms below the frontier. Second, competition and productivity growth display an inverted-U
relationship: starting for an initially low level of competition, higher competition stimulates
innovation and growth; starting from a high initial level of competition, higher competition
has a less positive or even a negative e¤ect on innovation and productivity growth. Third,
patent protection complements product market competition in encouraging R&D investments
and innovation.
Understanding the relationship between competition and growth also helps improve our un-
derstanding of the relationship between trade and growth. Indeed there are several dimensions
to that relationship. First, the scale e¤ect, whereby liberalizing trade increases the market for
successful innovations and therefore the incentives to innovate; this is naturally captured by
any innovation-based model of growth including the Schumpeterian growth model. But there is
also a competition e¤ect of trade openness, which only the Schumpeterian model can capture.
This latter e¤ect appears to have been at work in emerging countries that implemented trade
liberalization reforms (for example India in the early 1990s), and it also explains why trade
restrictions are more detrimental to growth in more frontier countries (see Section 5 below).
10See Aghion and Gri¢ th (2006) for a rst attempt at synthetizing the theoretical and empirical debates on
competition and growth.
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3.1 From leapfrogging to step-by-step innovation11
3.1.1 The argument
To reconcile theory with the evidence on productivity growth and product market competition,
we replace the leapfrogging assumption of the model in the previous section (where incumbents
are systematically overtaken by outside researchers) with a less radical step-by-step assumption:
namely, a rm which is currently m steps behind the technological leader in the same sector
or industry, must catch up with the leader before becoming a leader itself. This step-by-step
assumption can be rationalized by supposing that an innovator acquires tacit knowledge that
cannot be duplicated by a rival without engaging in its own R&D to catch up. This leads to a
richer analysis of the interplay between product market competition, innovation, and growth
by allowing rms in some sectors to be neck-and-neck. In such sectors, increased product
market competition, by making life more di¢ cult for neck-and-neck rms, will encourage them
to innovate in order to acquire a lead over their rival in the sector. This we refer to as the
escape competition e¤ect. On the other hand, in sectors that are not neck-and-neck, increased
product market competition will have a more ambiguous e¤ect on innovation. In particular it
will discourage innovation by laggard rms when these do not put much weight on the (more
remote) prospect of becoming a leader and instead mainly look at the short-run extra prot
from catching up with the leader. This we call the Schumpeterian e¤ect. Finally, the steady
state fraction of neck-and-neck sectors will itself depend upon the innovation intensities in
neck-and-neck versus unleveled sectors. This we refer to as the composition e¤ect.
3.1.2 Household
Time is again continuous and a continuous measure L of individuals work in one of two activi-
ties: as production workers and as R&D workers. We assume that the representative household
consumes Ct; has logarithmic instantaneous utility U (Ct) = lnCt and discounts the future at
a rate  > 0: These assumptions deliver the households Euler equation as gt = rt : All costs
in this economy are in terms of labor units. Therefore, consumption of the household is equal
to the nal good production Ct = Yt which is also the resource constraint of this economy:
3.1.3 A multi-sector production function
To formalize these various e¤ects, in particular the composition e¤ect, we obviously need a
multiplicity of intermediate sectors instead of one as in the previous section. One simple way
of extending the Schumpeterian paradigm to a multiplicity of intermediate sectors is, as in
Grossman and Helpman (1991), to assume that the nal good is produced using a continuum
of intermediate inputs, according to the logarithmic production function:
lnYt =
Z 1
0
ln yjtdj: (7)
Next, we introduce competition by assuming that each sector j is duopolistic with respect
to production and research activities. We denote the two duopolists in sector j as Aj and Bj
11The following model and analysis are based on Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997), Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers (2001), Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2005) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012).
See also Peretto (1998) for related work.
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and assume for simplicity that yj is the sum of the intermediate goods produced by the two
duopolists in sector j:
yj = yAj + yBj :
The above logarithmic technology implies that in equilibrium the same amount is spent
at any time by nal good producers on each basket yj .12 We normalize the price of the nal
good to be 1. Thus a nal good producer chooses each yAj and yBj to maximize yAj + yBj
subject to the budget constraint: pAjyAj + pBjyBj = Y ; that is, she will devote the entire unit
expenditure to the least expensive of the two goods.
3.1.4 Technology and innovation
Each rm takes the wage rate as given and produces using labor as the only input according
to the following linear production function,
yit = Aitlit; i 2 fA;Bg
where ljt is the labor employed. Let ki denote the technology level of duopoly rm i in some
industry j; that is, Ai = ki ; i = A;B and  > 1 is a parameter that measures the size of
a leading-edge innovation: Equivalently, it takes  ki units of labor for rm i to produce one
unit of output. Thus the unit costs of production is simply ci = w ki which is independent
of the quantity produced.
An industry j is thus fully characterized by a pair of integers (kj ;mj) where kj is the
leaders technology and mj is the technological gap between the leader and the follower.13
For expositional simplicity, we assume that knowledge spillovers between the two rms in
any intermediate industry are such that neither rm can get more than one technological level
ahead of the other, that is:
m  1:
In other words, if a rm already one step ahead innovates, the lagging rm will automatically
learn to copy the leaders previous technology and thereby remain only one step behind. Thus,
at any point in time, there will be two kinds of intermediate sectors in the economy: (i) leveled
or neck-and-neck sectors where both rms are at technological par with one another, and (ii)
unleveled sectors, where one rm (the leader) lies one step ahead of its competitor (the laggard
or follower) in the same industry.14
12To see this, note that a nal good producer will choose the yjs to maximize u =
R
ln yjdj subject to the
budget constraint
R
pjyjdj = E; where E denotes current expenditures. The rst-order condition for this is:
@u=@yj = 1=yj = pj for all j
where  is a Lagrange multiplier. Together with the budget constraint this rst-order condition implies
pjyj = 1= = E for all j:
13The above logarithmic nal good technology together with the linear production cost structure for interme-
diate goods implies that the equilibrium prot ows of the leader and the follower in an industry depend only
upon the technological gap m between the two rms. We will see this below for the case where m  1:
14Aghion et al (2001) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) analyze the more general case where there is no limit
to how far ahead the leader can get.
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To complete the description of the model, we just need to specify the innovation technology.
Here we simply assume that by spending the R&D cost  (z) = z2=2 in units of labor, a
leader (or frontier) rm moves one technological step ahead, with probability z. We call z
the innovation rate or R&D intensity of the rm. We assume that a follower rm can
move one step ahead with probability h, even if it spends nothing on R&D, by copying the
leaders technology. Thus z2=2 is the R&D cost (in units of labor) of a follower rm moving
ahead with probability z+h: Let z0 denote the R&D intensity of each rm in a neck-and-neck
industry; and let z 1 denote the R&D intensity of a follower rm in an unleveled industry; if
z1 denotes the R&D intensity of the leader in an unleveled industry, note that z1 = 0, since
our assumption of automatic catch-up means that a leader cannot gain any further advantage
by innovating.
3.2 Equilibrium prots and competition in leveled and unleveled sectors
We can now determine the equilibrium prots of rms in each type of sector, and link them
with product market competition. The nal good producer in (7) generates a unit-elastic
demand with respect to each variety
yj =
Y
pj
: (8)
Consider rst an unleveled sector where the leaders unit cost is c: The leaders monopoly
prot is
p1y1   cy1 =

1  c
p1

Y
= 1Y
where the rst line uses (8) and the second line denes 1 as the equilibrium prot normalized
by the nal output Y . Note that the monopoly prot is monotonically increasing in the unit
price p1. However, the monopolist is constrained to setting a price p1  c because c is the
rivals unit cost, so at any higher price the rival could protably undercut her price and steal
all her business. She will therefore choose the maximum possible price p1 = c such that the
normalized prot in equilibrium is
1 = 1  1

:
The laggard in the unleveled sector will be priced out of the market and hence will earn a
zero prot:
 1 = 0
Consider now a leveled (neck-and-neck) sector. If the two rms engaged in open price
competition with no collusion, the equilibrium price would fall to the unit cost c of each
rm, resulting in zero prot. At the other extreme, if the two rms colluded so e¤ectively
as to maximize their joint prots and shared the proceeds, then they would together act like
the leader in an unleveled sector, each setting p = c (we assume that any third rm could
compete using the previous best technology, just like the laggard in an unleveled sector), and
each earning a normalized prot equal to 1=2:
9
So in a leveled sector both rms have an incentive to collude. Accordingly we model the
degree of product market competition inversely by the degree to which the two rms in a neck-
and-neck industry are able to collude. (They do not collude when the industry is unleveled
because the leader has no interest in sharing her prot.) Specically, we assume that the
normalized prot of a neck-and-neck rm is:
0 = (1 )1; 1=2    1;
and we parameterize product market competition by ; that is, one minus the fraction of a
leaders prots that the leveled rm can attain through collusion. Note that  is also the
incremental prot of an innovator in a neck-and-neck industry, normalized by the leaders
prot.
We next analyze how the equilibrium research intensities z0 and z 1 of neck-and-neck and
backward rms respectively, and consequently the aggregate innovation rate, vary with our
measure of competition .
3.3 The Schumpeterian and escape competition e¤ects
In balanced growth path, all aggregate variables, including rm values will grow at the rate
g: For tractability, we will normalize all growing variables by the aggregate output Y: Let Vm
(resp. V m) denote the normalized steady-state value of being currently a leader (resp. a
follower) in an industry with technological gap m; and let ! = w=Y denote the normalized
steady-state wage rate: We have the following Bellman equations:15
V0 = max
z0

0 + z0(V 1   V0) + z0(V1   V0)  !z20=2
	
(9)
V 1 = max
z 1

 1 + (z 1 + h)(V0   V 1)  !z2 1=2
	
(10)
V1 = 1 + (z 1 + h)(V0   V1) (11)
where z0 denotes the R&D intensity of the other rm in a neck-and-neck industry (we focus
on a symmetric equilibrium where z0 = z0). Note that we already used z1 = 0 in (11).
In words, the growth-adjusted annuity value V0 of currently being neck-and-neck is equal
to the corresponding prot ow 0 plus the expected capital gain z0(V1   V0) of acquiring a
lead over the rival plus the expected capital loss z0(V 1 V0) if the rival innovates and thereby
becomes the leader, minus the R&D cost !z20=2: Similarly, the annuity value V1 of being a
technological leader in an unleveled industry is equal to the current prot ow 1 plus the
expected capital loss z 1(V0   V1) if the leader is being caught up by the laggard (recall that
a leader does not invest in R&D in equilibrium); nally, the annuity value V 1 of currently
being a laggard in an unleveled industry, is equal to the corresponding prot ow  1 plus the
expected capital gain (z 1+ h)(V0 V 1) of catching up with the leader, minus the R&D cost
!z2 1=2:
Using the fact that z0 maximizes (9) and z 1 maximizes (10), we have the rst order
conditions:
!z0 = V1   V0 (12)
!z 1 = V0   V 1: (13)
15Note that originally the left-hand-side is written as rV0   _V0: Note that in BGP, _V0 = gV0; therefore we get
(r   g)V0: Finally using households Euler equation r   g = ; leads to the Bellman equations in the text.
10
In Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997) the model is closed by a labor market clearing equation
which determines ! as a function of the aggregate demand for R&D plus the aggregate demand
for manufacturing labor. Here, for simplicity we shall ignore that equation and take the wage
rate ! as given, normalizing it at ! = 1:
Then, using (12) and (13) to eliminate the V s from the system of equations (9)-(11), we
end up with system of two equations in the two unknowns z0 and z 1 :
z20=2 + (+ h)z0   (1   0) = 0 (14)
z2 1=2 + (+ z0 + h)z 1   (0    1)  z20=2 = 0 (15)
These equations solve recursively for unique positive values of z0 and z 1; and we are mainly
interested in how equilibrium R&D intensities are a¤ected by an increase in product market
competition : It is straightforward to see from equation (14) and the fact that
1   0 = 1
that an increase in  will increase the innovation intensity z0() of a neck-and-neck rm. This
is the escape competition e¤ect.
Then, plugging z0() into (15), we can look at the e¤ect of an increase in competition 
on the innovation intensity z 1 of a laggard. This e¤ect is ambiguous in general: in particular,
for very high , the e¤ect is negative as then z 1 varies like
0    1 = (1 )1:
In this case the laggard is very impatient and thus looks at its short term net prot ow if it
catches up with the leader, which in turn decreases when competition increases. This is the
Schumpeterian e¤ect. However, for low values of ; this e¤ect is counteracted by an anticipated
escape competition e¤ect.
Thus the e¤ect of competition on innovation depends on the situation in which a sector is.
In unleveled sectors, the Schumpeterian e¤ect is at work even if it does not always dominate.
But in leveled (neck-and-neck) sectors, the escape-competition e¤ect is the only e¤ect at work;
that is, more competition induces neck-and-neck rms to innovate in order to escape from a
situation in which competition constrains prots.
On average, an increase in product market competition will have an ambiguous e¤ect on
growth. It induces faster productivity growth in currently neck-an-neck sectors and slower
growth in currently unleveled sectors. The overall e¤ect on growth will thus depend on the
(steady-state) fraction of leveled versus unleveled sectors. But this steady-state fraction is
itself endogenous, since it depends upon equilibrium R&D intensities in both types of sectors.
We proceed to show under which condition this overall e¤ect is an inverted U, and at the same
time derive additional predictions for further empirical testing.
3.3.1 Composition e¤ect and the inverted-U
In a steady state, the fraction of sectors 1 that are unleveled is constant, as is the fraction
0 = 1  1 of sectors that are leveled. The fraction of unleveled sectors that become leveled
each period will be z 1 + h, so the sectors moving from unleveled to leveled represent the
fraction (z 1 + h)1 of all sectors. Likewise, the fraction of all sectors moving in the opposite
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direction is 2z00; since each of the two neck-and-neck rms innovates with probability z0. In
steady state, the fraction of rms moving in one direction must equal the fraction moving in
the other direction:
(z 1 + h)1 = 2z0 (1  1) ;
which can be solved for the steady state fraction of unleveled sectors:
1 =
2z0
z 1 + h+ 2z0
: (16)
This implies that the aggregate ow of innovations in all sectors is16
x =
4 (z 1 + h) z0
z 1 + h+ 2z0
:
One can show that for  large but h not too large, aggregate innovation x follows an
inverted-U pattern: it increases with competition  for small enough values of  and decreases
for large enough : The inverted-U shape results from the composition e¤ect whereby a change
in competition changes the steady-state fraction of sectors that are in the leveled state, where
the escape-competition e¤ect dominates, versus the unleveled state, where the Schumpeterian
e¤ect dominates. At one extreme, when there is not much product market competition, there
is not much incentive for neck-and-neck rms to innovate, and therefore the overall innovation
rate will be highest when the sector is unleveled. Thus the industry will be quick to leave the
unleveled state (which it does as soon as the laggard innovates) and slow to leave the leveled
state (which will not happen until one of the neck-and-neck rms innovates). As a result, the
industry will spend most of the time in the leveled state, where the escape-competition e¤ect
dominates (z0 is increasing in ). In other words, if the degree of competition is very low to
begin with, an increase in competition should result in a faster average innovation rate. At the
other extreme, when competition is initially very high, there is little incentive for the laggard
in an unleveled state to innovate. Thus the industry will be slow to leave the unleveled state.
Meanwhile, the large incremental prot 1   0 gives rms in the leveled state a relatively
large incentive to innovate, so that the industry will be relatively quick to leave the leveled
state. As a result, the industry will spend most of the time in the unleveled state where the
Schumpeterian e¤ect is the dominant e¤ect. In other words, if the degree of competition is
very high to begin with, an increase in competition should result in a slower average innovation
rate.
Finally, using the fact that the log of an industrys output rises by the amount ln  each
time the industry completed a two-cycle from neck-and-neck (m = 0) to unleveled (m = 1)
and then back to neck and neck, the average growth rate of nal output g is simply equal to
the frequency of completed cycles times ln : But the frequency of completed cycles is itself
equal to the fraction of time 1 spent in the unleveled state times the frequency (z 1 + h) of
innovation when in that state. Hence, overall, we have:
g = 1 (z 1 + h) ln  =
x
2
ln :
Thus productivity growth follows the same pattern as aggregate innovation with regard to
product market competition.
16x is the sum of the two ows: (z 1 + h)1 + 2z0 (1  1). But since the two ows are equal, x =
2 (z 1 + h)1: Substituting for 1 using (16) yields x =
4(z 1+h)z0
z 1+h+2z0 :
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3.4 Predictions
A rst testable prediction is that:
Prediction 1: The relationship between competition and innovation follows an inverted-U
pattern and the average technological gap within a sector (1 in the above model) increases
with competition.
This prediction is tested by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2005), ABBGH,
using a rm-level panel data set of UK rms listed on the London Stock Exchange between
1970 and 1994. Competition is measured by the Lerner Index, or price-cost margin. The
Lerner Index is itself dened by operating prots net of depreciation and of the nancial cost
of capital, divided by sales, averaged across rms within an industry. Figure 1 shows the
inverted-U pattern, and it also shows that if we restrict attention to industries above the
median degree of neck-and-neckness, the upward sloping part of the inverted U is steeper than
if we consider the whole sample of industries. ABBGH also show that the average technological
gap across rms within an industry also increases with the degree of competition the industry
is subject to.
Prediction 2: More intense competition enhances innovation in "frontier" rms but may
discourage it in "non-frontier" rms.
This prediction is tested by Aghion, Blundell, Gri¢ th, Howitt and Prantl (2009). These
authors use UK rm level panel data, with over 32,000 annual observations of rms across
166 four-digit industries to look at productivity growth responds di¤erently in rms that are
more-than-median close to the world productivity frontier compared to rms that are less-than-
median close to the technology frontier. Competition is measured by the rate of foreign entry
(more precisely, by the change in the share of UK industry employment in foreign-owned plants
in the sector) and it is instrumented by policy reforms (deregulation) that were implemented in
the UK as part of the implementation of the European Single Market Program. As shown by
Figure 2, the upper line depicting how productivity growth responds to entry in more "frontier"
rms, is upward sloping, which reects the escape competition e¤ect at work in neck-and-neck
sectors; in contrast, the lower line depicting how productivity growth responds to entry in "less
frontier" rms is downward sloping, which reects the Schumpeterian e¤ect of competition on
innovation in laggard rms.
Prediction 3: There is complementarity between patent protection and product market
competition in fostering innovation.
In the above model, competition reduces the prot ow 0 of non-innovating neck-and-
neck rms whereas patent protection is likely to enhance the prot ow 1 of an innovating
neck-and-neck rm. Both contribute to raising the net prot gain (1   0) of an innovating
neck-and-neck rm, in other word both types of policies tend to enhance the escape compe-
tition e¤ect. That competition and patenting should be complementary in enhancing growth
rather than mutually exclusive, is at odds with Romer (1990)s product variety model where
competition is always detrimental to innovation and growth (as we discussed above) and for
exactly the same reason for why intellectual property rights (IPRs) in form of patent protec-
tion are good for innovation: namely competition reduces post innovation rents whereas patent
protection increases these rents.17 Recent evidence supporting Prediction 3 was provided by
17Similarly, in Boldrin and Levine (2008), patenting is detrimental to competition and thereby to innovation
for the same reason for why competition is good for innovation. To provide support to their analysis the two
authors build a growth model where innovation and growth can occur under perfect competition. The model
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Qian (2007) and by Aghion, Howitt and Prantl (2012). Qian uses the passage of national
pharmaceutical patent law as a natural experiment to test the economic impact of patent. She
nds that implementation of patents stimulates innovation mostly in countries with higher
market freedom. Similarly, Aghion, Howitt and Prantl look at the e¤ects of implementation
of the single market program on R&D expenditures in countries with di¤erent degrees of IPR.
Thus they look at 13 manufacturing industries in 15 OECD countries between 1987 and 2005,
and nd that the implementation of the single market program leads to an increase in R&D
expenditure in countries with strong IPR, not in others. Moreover, the positive response of
R&D expenditure to the single market program in strong IPR countries is more pronounced
among rms in industries whose equivalent in the US indicate higher patent intensity. This is
evidence of a complementarity between IPRs and competition.
Figure 1: Competition vs Innovation Figure 2: Growth vs Entry
Level of competition
4 Schumpeterian growth and rm dynamics
One of the main applications of the Schumpeterian theory has been the study of rm dynamics.
The empirical literature has documented various stylized facts using micro rm level data.
Some of these facts are: (i) the rm size distribution is highly skewed; (ii) rm size and rm
age are highly correlated; (iii) small rms exit more frequently, but the ones that survive tend
to grow faster than average growth rate; (iv) a large fraction of R&D in the US is done by
incumbents; (v) reallocation of inputs between entrants and incumbents is an important source
of productivity growth.
These are some of the well-known empirical facts that non-Schumpeterian growth models
cannot account for. In particular, the rst four facts listed require a new rm to enter, expand,
then shrink over time, and eventually be replaced by new entrants. These and the last fact
on the importance of reallocation are all embodied in the Schumpeterian idea of creative
destruction.
We will now consider a setup that follows closely the highly inuential work by Klette and
Kortum (2004). This model will add two elements to the baseline model of Section 2: First,
innovations will come from both entrants and incumbents. Second, rms will be dened as a
is then used to argue that monopoly rents and therefore patents are not needed for innovation and growth: on
the contrary, patents are detrimental to innovation because they reduce competition.
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collection of production units where successful innovations by incumbents will allow them to
expand in product space. Creative destruction will be the central force that drives innovation,
invariant rm size distribution and aggregate productivity growth on a balanced growth path.
4.1 The setup
Time is again continuous and a continuous measure L of individuals work in one of three
activities: (i) as production workers, l; (ii) as R&D scientists in incumbent rms, si and
(iii) as R&D scientists in potential entrants, se. The utility function is logarithmic, therefore
households Euler equation is gt = rt   : The nal good is produced competitively using a
combination of intermediate goods according to the following production function
lnYt =
Z 1
0
ln yjtdj (17)
where yj is the quantity produced of intermediate j: Intermediates are produced monopolisti-
cally by the innovator who innovated last within that product line j, according to the following
linear technology:
yjt = Ajtljt
where Ajt is the product-line-specic labor productivity and ljt is the labor employed for
production. This implies that the marginal cost of production in j is simply wt=Ajt where wt
is the wage rate in the economy at time t:
A rm in this model is dened as a collection of n production units (product lines) as
illustrated in Figure 3. Firms expand in product space through successful innovations.
Figure 3: Example of a Firm
0 1
Firm f
quality level
A
product line
j
To innovate, rms combine their existing knowledge stock that they accumulated over time
(n) with scientists (Si) according to the following Cobb-Douglas production function
Zi =

Si

 1

n
1  1
 (18)
where Zi is the Poisson innovation ow rate, 1 is the elasticity of innovation with respect to
scientists and  is a scale parameter. Note that this production function generates the following
R&D cost of innovation
C (zi; n) = wnz

i
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where zi  Zi=n is simply dened as the innovation intensity of the rm. When a rm is
successful in its current R&D investment, it innovates over a random product line j0 2 [0; 1].
Then, the productivity in line j0 increases from Aj0 to Aj0 . The rm becomes the new
monopoly producer in line j0 and thereby increases the number of its production lines to n+1:
At the same time, each of its n current production lines is subject to the creative destruction x
by new entrants and other incumbents: Therefore during a small time interval dt; the number
of production units of a rm increases to n + 1 with probability Zidt and decreases to n   1
with probability nxdt: A rm that loses all of its product lines exits the economy.
4.2 Solving the model
As before, our focus is on a balanced growth path, where all aggregate variables grow at the
same rate g (to be determined): We will now proceed in two steps. First we will solve for the
static production decision and then turn to the dynamic innovation decision of rms which
will determine the equilibrium rate of productivity growth, as well as various rm moments
along with the invariant rm size distribution.
4.2.1 Static production decision
As in Section 3, nal good producer spends the same amount Yt on each variety j: As a result,
nal good production function in (17) generates a unit elastic demand with respect to each
variety: yjt = Yt=pjt. Combined with the fact that rms in a single product line compete à
la Bertrand, this implies that a monopolist with marginal cost wt=Ajt will follow limit pricing
by setting its price equal to the marginal cost of the previous innovator pjt = wt=Ajt: The
resulting equilibrium quantity and prot in product line j are:
yjt =
AjtYt
wt
and jt = Yt: (19)
where    1 : Note that prots are constant across product lines, which will signicantly
simplify the aggregation up to the rm level. Note also that the demand for production workers
in each line is simply Yt= (wt) :
4.2.2 Dynamic innovation decision
Next we turn to the innovation decision of the rms. The stock-market value of an n product
rm Vt (n) at date t; satises the Bellman equation:
rVt (n)  _Vt (n) = max
zi0
8<:
nt   wtnzi
+nzi [Vt (n+ 1)  Vt (n)]
+nx [Vt (n  1)  Vt (n)]
9=; : (20)
The intuition behind this expression is as follows. The rm collects a total of nt prots from
n product lines and invests in total wtnz

i in R&D. As a result, it innovates at the ow rate
Zi  nzi in which case it gains Vt (n+ 1) Vt (n) : In addition, the rm loses each of its product
lines through creative destruction at the rate x; which means that a production line will be
lost overall at a rate nx, leading to a loss of Vt (n) Vt (n  1) : It is a straightforward exercise
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to show that the value function in (20) is linear in the number of product lines n and also
proportional to aggregate output Yt, with the form:
Vt (n) = nvYt:
In this expression v = Vt (n) =nYt is simply the average normalized value of a production unit
which is endogenously determined as
v =
   !zi
+ x  zi : (21)
Note that this expression uses the Euler equation  = r   g and that labor share is dened as
!  wt=Yt, which is constant in balanced growth path: In the absence of incumbent innovation,
i.e. zi = 0; this value is equivalent to the baseline model (1) : The fact that incumbents can
innovate modies the baseline value in two opposite directions: First the cost R&D investment
is subtracted from the gross prot which lowers the net instantaneous return  !zi . However,
each product line comes with an R&D option value, that is having one more production unit
increases the R&D capacity of the rm as in (18) and therefore the rm value.
The equilibrium innovation decision of an incumbent is simply found through the rst-order
condition of (20)
zi =

v
!
 1
 1
: (22)
As expected, innovation intensity is increasing in the value of innovation v and decreasing in
the labor cost !:
4.2.3 Free entry
We consider a mass of entrants that produce one unit of innovation by hiring  number of
scientists. When a new entrant is successful, it innovates over a random product line by
improving its productivity by  > 1: It then starts out as a single product rm. Let us denote
the entry rate by ze: The free-entry condition equates the value of a new entry Vt (1) to the
cost of innovation  wt such that
v = ! : (23)
Recall that the rate of creative destruction is simply the entry rate plus an incumbents inno-
vation intensity, i.e., x = zi+ ze: Using this fact, together with (21) ; (22) and (23) delivers the
equilibrium entry rate and incumbent innovation intensity:
ze =

! 
  1


 

 1
 1
   and zi =

 

 1
 1
:
4.2.4 Labor market clearing
Now we are ready to close the model by imposing the labor market clearing condition. The
equilibrium labor share ! equates the supply of labor L to the sum of aggregate labor de-
mand coming from (i) production, (!) 1, (ii) incumbent R&D, 

 

 
 1
; and (iii) outside
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entrants, !   

 

 
 1    : The resulting labor share is
! =
wt
Yt
=
1
L+  
4.3 Equilibrium growth rate
In this model, innovation takes place by both incumbents and entrants at the total rate of
x = zi + ze: Hence the equilibrium growth rate is
g = x ln 
=
"
   1


L
 
+

   1


 

 1
 1
  

#
ln :
In addition to the standard e¤ects, such as the growth rate increasing in the size of innovation
and decreasing in the discount rate, this model generates an interesting non-linear relationship
between entry cost  and growth. An increase in the entry cost reduces the entry rate and
therefore has a negative e¤ect on equilibrium growth. However, this e¤ect also frees up those
scientists that used to be employed by outside entrants and reallocates them to incumbents,
hence increasing innovation by incumbents and growth. This is an interesting trade-o¤ for
industrial policy. In a recent work, Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom and Kerr (2012) analyze the
e¤ects of various industrial policies on equilibrium productivity growth, including entry subsidy
and incumbent R&D subsidy, in an enriched version of the above framework.
4.4 Predictions
Now we go back to the initial list of predictions and discuss how they are captured by the
above model.
Prediction 1: The size distribution of rms is highly skewed.
In this model, rm size is summarized by the number of product lines of a rm. Let us
denote by n the fraction of rms that have n products. The invariant distribution n is found
by equating the inows into state n to the outows from it:
1x = ze
(zi + x)1 = 22x+ ze
(zi + x)nn = n+1 (n+ 1)x+ n 1 (n  1) zi for n  2
The rst line equates exits to entry. The left-hand side of the second line consists of outows
from being a 1-product rm which happens when a 1-product rm innovates itself and becomes
a 2-product rm or is replaced by another rm at the rate x: The right-hand side is the sum
of the inows coming from 2-product rms or from outsiders. The third line generalizes the
second line to n product rms. The resulting rm size distribution is geometric
n (ze=zi) =
ze=zi
(1 + ze=zi)
n n
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and highly skewed as shown in a vast empirical literature (Simon and Bonini (1958), Ijiri and
Simon (1977), Schmalensee (1989), Stanley et al. (1995), Axtell (2001) and Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright (2007)).
Figure 4: Firm Size Distribution
Several alternative Schumpeterian models have been proposed after Klette and Kortum (2004)
that feature invariant rm size distributions with a Pareto tail (See Acemoglu and Cao (2011)
for an example and a discussion of the literature.)
Prediction 2: Firm size and rm age is positively correlated.
In the current model, rms are born with a size of 1. It requires subsequent successes for
rms to grow in size which naturally produces a positive correlation between size and age.
This regularity has been documented extensively in the literature. (For recent discussions
and additional references see Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2010) and Akcigit and Kerr
(2010))
Prediction 3: Small rms exit more frequently. The ones that survive tend to grow faster
than average.
In the above model, rm exit happens through the loss of product lines. Conditional on not
producing a new innovation, a rms probability of loosing all of its product lines and exiting
within a period is (xt)n which decreases in n: Clearly it becomes much more di¢ cult for a
rm to exit when it expands in product space.
The facts that small rms exit more frequently and grow faster conditional on survival
have been widely documented in the literature (for early work, see Birch (1981,1987), Davis,
Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996). For more recent work on this, see Haltiwanger, Jarmin and
Miranda (2010), Akcigit and Kerr (2010), Neumark, Wall and Zhang (2008)).
Prediction 4: A large fraction of R&D is done by incumbents.
There is an extensive literature that studies R&D investment and patenting behavior of
existing rms in the US (see for instance, among many others, Acs and Audretsch (1988,
1991), Griliches (1990), Hall, Ja¤e, and Trajtenberg (2001), Cohen (1995), Cohen and Klepper
(1996). In particular, Freeman (1982), Pennings and Buitendam (1987), Tushman and An-
derson (1986), Scherer (1984) and Akcigit and Kerr (2010) show that large incumbents focus
on improving the existing technologies whereas small new entrants focus on innovating with
new radical products or technologies. Similarly, Akcigit, Hanley and Serrano-Velarde (2012)
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provides empirical evidence on French rms showing that large incumbents with a broad tech-
nological spectrum account for most of the private basic research investment.
On the theory side, Akcigit and Kerr (2010), Acemoglu and Cao (2011) and Acemoglu,
Akcigit, Hanley and Kerr (2012) have also provided alternative Schumpeterian models that
capture this fact.
Prediction 5: Both entrants and incumbents innovate. Moreover the reallocation of re-
sources among incumbents as well as from incumbents to new entrants are the major sources
of productivity growth.
A central feature of this model is that both incumbents and entrants innovate and contribute
to productivity growth. New entrants account for
ze
ze + zi
= 1 
"
   1


L
 
  



 
 1
 1
+
   1

# 1
percent of innovations in any given period. Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Foster, Halti-
wanger and Krizan (2001) have shown that 25% of productivity growth in the US is accounted
for by new entry and the remaining 75% by continuing plants. Moreover Foster, Haltiwanger
and Krizan (2001 and 2006) have shown that reallocation of resources through entry and
exit, accounts for around 50% of manufacturing and 90% of US retail productivity growth.
In a recently growing cross-country literature, Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2012), Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009) and Syverson (2011) describe how variations in reallocation
across countries explain di¤erences in productivity levels. Lentz and Mortensen (2008) and
Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom and Kerr (2012) estimate variants of the baseline Klette and Ko-
rtum (2004) to quantify the importance of reallocation and study the impacts of industrial
policy on reallocation and productivity growth.
5 Growth meets development
In this section, we argue that Schumpeterian growth theory helps bridge the gap between
growth and development economics, by o¤ering a simple framework to capture the idea that
growth-enhancing policies or institutions may vary with a countrys level of technological de-
velopment. In particular we will look at the role of democracy in the growth process, arguing
that democracy matters for growth to a larger extent in more advanced economies.
5.1 Innovation versus imitation and the notion of appropriate institution
Innovations in one sector or one country often build on knowledge that was created by in-
novations in another sector or country. The process of di¤usion, or technology spillover, is
an important factor behind cross-country convergence. Howitt (2000) showed how this can
lead to cross-country conditional convergence of growth rates in Schumpeterian growth mod-
els. Specically, a country that starts far behind the world technology frontier can grow faster
than one close to the frontier because the former country will make a larger technological ad-
vance every time one of its sectors catches up to the global frontier. In Gerschenkrons (1962)
terms, countries far from the frontier enjoy an advantage of backwardness.This advantage
implies that in the long run a country with a low rate of innovation will fall behind the frontier,
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but will grow at the same rate as the frontier; as they fall further behind, the advantage of
backwardness eventually stabilizes the gap that separates them from the frontier.
These same considerations imply that policies and institutions that are appropriate for
countries close to the global technology frontier are often di¤erent from those that are appro-
priate for non-frontier countries, because those policies and institutions that help a country
to copy, adapt and implement leading-edge technologies are not necessarily the same as those
that help it to make leading-edge innovations. The idea of appropriate institutions was to be
developed more systematically by Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), henceforth AAZ,
and it underlies more recent work, in particular Acemoglu and Robinsons best-selling book
"Why Nations Fail" (Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)), where the authors rely on a rich set of
country studies to argue that sustained growth requires creative destruction and therefore is
not sustainable in countries with "extractive institutions".
A particularly direct and simpler way to formalize the idea of appropriate growth policy,
is to move for a moment from continuous to discrete time. Following AAZ and more remotely
Nelson and Phelps (1966), let At denote the current average productivity in the domestic
country, and At denote the current (world) frontier productivity. Then, think of innovation
as multiplying productivity by factor , and of imitation as catching-up with the frontier
technology.
Then, if the fraction n of sectors innovates and the fraction m imitates, we have:
At+1  At = n (   1)At + m
 
At  At

:
This in turn implies that productivity growth hinges upon the countrys degree of "fron-
tierness", i.e. its proximityat = At=At to the world frontier, namely:
gt =
At+1  At
At
= n (   1) + m
 
a 1t   1

:
In particular:
Prediction 1: The closer to the frontier an economy is, that is, the closer to one the
proximity variable at is, the more is growth driven by "innovation-enhancing" rather than
"imitation-enhancing" policies or institutions.
5.2 Further evidence on appropriate growth policies and institutions
In Section 3 above we already mentioned some recent evidence to the prediction that compe-
tition and free-entry should be more growth-enhancing. Using a cross-country panel of more
than 100 countries over the 1960-2000 period, AAZ regress the average growth rate on a coun-
trys distance to the US frontier (measured by the ratio of GDP per capita in that country
to per-capita GDP in the US) at the beginning of the period. Then, they split the sample of
countries in two groups, corresponding respectively to countries that are more open than the
median and to countries that are less open than the median. The prediction is:
Prediction 2: Average growth should decrease more rapidly as a country approaches the
world frontier when openness is low.
To measure openness one can use imports plus exports divided by aggregate GDP. But
this measure su¤ers from obvious endogeneity problems: in particular, exports and imports
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are likely to be inuenced by domestic growth. To deal with endogeneity problem, Frankel
and Romer (1999) construct a more exogenous measure of openness which relies on exogenous
characteristics such as land area, common borders, geographical distance, population, etc., and
it is this measure that AAZ use to measure openness in the following gures.
Figure 5: Growth, Openness and Distance to Frontier
A: Less Open Countries (Cross-Section) B: More Open Countries (Cross-Section)
C: Less Open Countries (Panel) D: More Open Countries (Panel)
Figures 5A and 5B below show the cross-sectional regressions: here, average growth over
the whole 1960-2000 period is regressed over the countrys distance to the world technology
frontier in 1965, respectively for more open and less open countries. A countrys distance to
the frontier is measured by the ratio between the log of this countrys level of per capita GDP
and the maximum of the logs of per capita GDP across all countries (which corresponds to the
log of per capita GDP in the US). 18
Figures 5C and 5D show the results of panel regressions where AAZ decompose the period
1960-2000 in ve year subperiods and then for each subperiod AAZ regress average growth
18That the regression lines should all be downward sloping, reects that the fact that countries farther below
the world technology frontier achieve bigger technological leaps whenever they successfully catch up with the
frontier (this is the "advantage of backwardness" we were mentioning above). More formally, for given n and
m; gt = n (   1) + m
 
a 1t   1

is decreasing in at:
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over the period on distance to frontier at the beginning of the subperiod, respectively for more
open and less open countries. These latter regressions control for country xed e¤ects. In
both, cross-sectional and panel regressions we see that while a low degree of openness does
not appear to be detrimental to growth in countries far below the world frontier, it becomes
increasingly detrimental to growth as the country approaches the frontier.
AAZ repeat the same exercise using entry costs faced by new rms instead of openness.
The prediction is:
Prediction 3: High entry barriers become increasingly detrimental to growth as the country
approaches the frontier.
Entry costs in turn are measured by the number of days to create a new rm in the various
countries (see Djankov et al (2002)). Here, the country sample is split between countries with
high barriers relative to the median and countries with low barriers relative to the median.
Figures 6A and 6B show the cross-sectional regressions, respectively for low and high barrier
countries, whereas Figures 6C and 6D show the panel regressions for the same two subgroups
of countries. Both types of regressions show that while high entry barriers do not appear
to be detrimental to growth in countries far below the world frontier, they indeed become
increasingly detrimental to growth as the country approaches the frontier.
Figure 6: Growth, Entry and Distance to Frontier
A: High Barrier Countries (Cross-Section) B: Low Barrier Countries (Cross-Section)
C: High Barrier Countries (Panel) D: Low Barrier Countries (Panel)
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These two empirical exercises point to the importance of interacting institutions or policies
with technological variables in growth regressions: openness is particularly growth-enhancing
in countries that are closer to the technological frontier; entry is more growth-enhancing in
countries or sectors that are closer to the technological frontier; below we will see that higher
(in particular, graduate) education tends to be more growth-enhancing in countries or in
US states that are closer to the technological frontier, whereas primary-secondary (possibly
undergraduate) education tends to be more growth enhancing in countries or in US states that
are farther below the frontier.
A third piece of evidence is provided by Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche (2009)
who use cross-US-states panel data to look at how spending on various levels of education
matter di¤erently for growth across US states with di¤erent levels of frontierness as measured
by their average productivity compared to frontier-state (Californian) productivity. The solid
black bars do not factor in the mobility of workers across US states whereas the grey bars do.
The more frontier a country or region is, the more its growth relies on frontier innovation and
therefore our prediction is:
Prediction 4: The more frontier an economy is, the more growth in this economy relies
on research education.
As shown in the gure below, research type education is always more growth-enhancing in
states that are more frontier, whereas a bigger emphasis on two year colleges is more growth-
enhancing in US states that are farther below the productivity frontier. This is not surprising:
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) obtain similar conclusions using cross-country panel
data, namely that tertiary education is more positively correlated with productivity growth in
countries that are closer to the world technology frontier.
Figure 7: Growth, Education and Distance to Frontier
5.3 Political economy of creative destruction
Does democracy enhance or hamper economic growth? One may think of various channels
whereby democracy should a¤ect per capita GDP growth. A rst channel is that democ-
racy pushes for more redistribution from rich to poor, and that redistribution in turn a¤ects
growth. Thus Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) analyze the rela-
tionship between inequality, democratic voting, and growth. They develop models in which
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redistribution from rich to poor is detrimental to growth as it discourages capital accumula-
tion. More inequality is then also detrimental to growth because it results in the median voter
becoming poorer and therefore demanding more redistribution. A second channel, which we
explore in this section, is Schumpeterian: namely, democracy reduces the scope for expropriat-
ing successful innovators or for incumbents to prevent new entry by using political pressure or
bribes: in other words, democracy facilitates creative destruction and thereby encourages in-
novation.19 To the extent that innovation matters more for growth in more frontier economies,
the prediction is:
Prediction 5: The correlation between democracy and innovation/growth is more positive
and signicant in more frontier economies.
The relationship between democracy, "frontierness" and growth, thus provides yet another
illustration of our notion of appropriate institutions. In the next subsection we develop a
simple Schumpeterian model which generates this prediction.
5.3.1 The formal argument
Consider the following Schumpeterian model in discrete time. All agents and also rms live
for one period. In each period t a nal good (henceforth the numeraire) is produced in each
state by a competitive sector using a continuum one of intermediate inputs, according to the
technology:
lnYt =
Z 1
0
ln yjtdj; (24)
where the intermediate products are produced again by labor according to
yjt = Ajtljt: (25)
There is a competitive fringe of rms in each sector that are capable of producing a product
with technology level Ajt=. So, as before, each incumbents prot ow is
jt = Yt
where    1 : Note that as in (19) ; each incumbent will produce using the same amount of
labor
ljt =
Yt
wt
 l; (26)
where l is the economys total use of manufacturing labor. We assume that there is measure 1
unit of labor which is used only for production. Therefore l = 1 implies
wt =
Yt

:
Finally, (24) ; (25) and (26) delivers the nal output as a function of the aggregate productivity
At in this economy:
Yt = At
where lnAt 
R 1
0 lnAjtdj is the end-of-period-t aggregate productivity index:
19Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) formalize another reason, also Schumpeterian, as to why democracy matters
for innovation: namely, new innovations do not only destroy the economic rents of incumbent producers, they
also threaten the power of incumbent political leaders.
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Technology and entry Let At denote the new world productivity frontier at date t and
assume that
At = At 1
with  > 1 is exogenously given. We shall again emphasize the distinction already made in the
previous section, between sectors in which the incumbent producer is neck-and-neckwith the
frontier and those in which the incumbent rm is below the frontier: at the beginning of date
t a sector j can either be at the current frontier, with productivity level Abjt = At 1 (advanced
sector) or one step below the frontier, with productivity level Abjt = At 2 (backward sector).
Thus imitation -or knowledge spillovers- in this model, mean that whenever the frontier moves
up one step from At 1 to At, then automatically backward sectors also move up one step from
At 2 to At 1.
In each intermediate sector j only one incumbent rm Ij and one potential entrant Ej are
active in each period. In this model, innovation in a sector is made only by a potential entrant
Ej since innovation does not change incumbents prot rate. Before production takes place,
potential entrant Ej invests in R&D in order to replace the incumbent Ij : If successful, it
increases the current productivity of sector j to Ajt = Abjt and becomes the new monopolist
and produces. Otherwise, the current incumbent preserves its monopoly right and produces
with the beginning-of-period productivity Ajt = Abjt and the period ends. The timing of events
is described in Figure 8.
Figure 8: Timing of Events
Period t starts with
productivity Abjt
in line j.
Incumbent Ij
and entrant Ej are
randomly chosen
Ej invests
in R&D to
replace Ij
through
creative
destruction
Ej succeeds and produces
with productivity
Ajt = γA
b
jt
Ej fails and incumbent
Ij produces with
productivity Ajt =A
b
jt
Period
t ends
Finally, the innovation technology is as follows: if a potential entrant Ej spends Atz2jt=2
in R&D in terms of the nal good, then she innovates with probability zjt:
Democracy Entry into a sector is subject to the democratic environment in the domestic
country. Similar to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), we model democracy as freedom to entry.
More specically, in a country with democracy level  2 [0; 1] ; a successful innovation leads
to successful entry only with probability ; and it is blocked with probability (1  ) : As a
result, the probability of an unblocked entry is zj : An unblocked entrant raises productivity
from Abjt to A
b
jt and becomes the new monopoly producer.
Equilibrium innovation investments We can now analyze the innovation decision of the
potential entrant Ej :
max
zjt
(
zjtYt  At
z2jt
2
)
:
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In equilibrium we get
zjt = z =


where we used the fact that Yt = At: Thus the aggregate equilibrium innovation e¤ort is
increasing in prot  and decreasing in R&D cost . Most importantly for us in this section,
innovation rate is increasing in the democracy level  :
@z
@
> 0:
Growth Now we can turn to the equilibrium growth rate of average productivity. We will
denote the fraction of advanced sectors by  which will also be the index for frontierness of
the domestic country. The average productivity of a country at the beginning of date t is
At 1 
Z 1
0
Ajtdj =  At 1 + (1  ) At 2
Average productivity at the end of the same period, is:20
At = 

z At 1 + (1  z) At 1

+ (1  ) At 1
Then the growth rate of average productivity is simply equal to:
gt =
At  At 1
At 1
= 
z (   1) + 1
 (   1) + 1   1 > 0
As it is clear from the above expression, democracy is always growth enhancing
@gt
@
=

z +
@z
@


 (   1)
 (   1) + 1 > 0:
Moreover, democracy is more growth enhancing the closer the domestic country is to the
world technology frontier:
@2gt
@@
=

z +
@z
@


(   1) 
[ (   1) + 1]2 > 0
This result is quite intuitive. Democratization allows for more turnover which in turn
encourages outsiders to innovate and replace the incumbents. Since frontier countries rely
more on innovation and benet less from imitation or spillover, the result follows.
5.3.2 Evidence
A rst piece of evidence supporting Prediction 5, is provided by Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi
(2007), henceforth AAT. The paper uses employment and productivity data at industry level
across countries and over time. Their sample includes 28 manufacturing sectors for 180 coun-
tries over the period 1964 to 2003. Democracy is measured using the Polity 4 indicator, which
20Here we make use of the assumption that backward sectors are automatically upgraded as the technology
frontier moves up.
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itself is constructed from combining constraints on the executive, the openness and competitive-
ness of executive recruitment, and the competitiveness of political participation. Frontierness
is measured by the log of the value added of a sector divided by the maximum of the log of
the same variable in the same sectors across all countries; or by ratio of the log of GDP per
worker in the sector over the maximum of the log of per capita GDP in similar sectors across
all countries. AAT take one minus these ratios as proxies for a sectors distance to the tech-
nological frontier. AAT focus on 5-year and 10-years growth rates. They compute rates over
non-overlapping periods and in particular 5-years growth rates are computed over the periods
1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000. For the 10-year growth rates they use alternatively
the years 1975, 1985, 1995 and the years 1980, 1990, and 2000.
AAT regress growth of either value added or employment in an industrial sector on democ-
racy (and other measures of civil rights), the countrys or industrys frontierness, and the
interaction term between the latter two. AAT also add time, country and industry xed
e¤ects.
The result is that the interaction coe¢ cient between frontierness and democracy is positive
and signicant, meaning that the more frontier the industry is, the more growth-enhancing
democracy in the country is for that sector. Figure 9 below provides an illustration of the re-
sults. It plots the rate of value-added growth against a measure of the countrys proximity to
the technological frontier (namely the ratio of the countrys labor productivity to the frontier
labor productivity). The dotted line shows the linear regression of industry growth on democ-
racy for countries that are less democratic than the median country (on the democracy scale),
whereas the full line the corresponding relationship for countries that are more democratic
than the median country. We see that growth is higher in more democratic countries when
these are close to the technological frontier, but not when these are far below the frontier.
Figure 9: Growth, Democracy and Distance to Frontier
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6 Schumpeterian waves
What causes long-term accelerations and slowdowns in economic growth, and underlies the
long swings sometimes referred to as Kondratie¤ cycles? In particular, what caused American
growth in GDP and productivity to accelerate starting in the mid-1990s? The most popular
explanation relies on the notion of general-purpose technologies (GPTs).
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) dene a GPT as a technological innovation that af-
fects production and/or innovation in many sectors of an economy. Well-known examples in
economic history include the steam engine, electricity, the laser, turbo reactors, and more re-
cently the information-technology (IT) revolution. Three fundamental features characterize
most GPTs. First, their pervasiveness: GPTs are used in most sectors of an economy and
thereby generate palpable macroeconomic e¤ects. Second, their scope for improvement: GPTs
tend to underperform upon being introduced; only later do they fully deliver their potential
productivity growth. Third, innovation spanning: GPTs make it easier to invent new products
and processes that is, to generate new secondary innovations- of higher quality.
Although each GPT raises output and productivity in the long run, it can also cause cyclical
uctuations while the economy adjusts to it. As David (1990) and Lipsey and Bekar (1995)
have argued, GPTs like the steam engine, the electric dynamo, the laser, and the computer
require costly restructuring and adjustment to take place, and there is no reason to expect
this process to proceed smoothly over time. Thus, contrary to the predictions of real-business-
cycle theory, the initial e¤ect of a positive technology shockmay not be to raise output,
productivity, and employment but to reduce them.21
Note that GPTs are Schumpeterian in nature, as they typically lead to older technologies
in all sectors of the economy to be abandoned as they di¤use to these sectors. Thus it is no
surprise that Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) used the Schumpeterian apparatus to develop
their model of GPT and growth. The basic idea of this model is that GPTs do not come ready
to use o¤ the shelf. Instead, each GPT requires an entirely new set of intermediate goods before
it can be implemented. The discovery and development of these intermediate goods is a costly
activity, and the economy must wait until some critical mass of intermediate components has
been accumulated before it is protable for rms to switch from the previous GPT. During the
period between the discovery of a new GPT and its ultimate implementation, national income
will fall as resources are taken out of production and put into R&D activities aimed at the
discovery of new intermediate input components.
6.1 Back to the basic Schumpeterian model
As a useful rst step toward a growth model with GPT, let us go back to the basic Schum-
peterian model outlaid in Section 2, but present it somewhat di¤erently. Recall that the repre-
sentative household has linear utility and the nal good is produced with a single intermediate
product according to
Yt = Aty

where y is the ow of intermediate input and A is the productivity parameter measuring the
quality of intermediate input y:
21For instance, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Hornstein and Krusell (1996) have studied the produc-
tivity slowdown during late 70s and early 80s caused by the IT revolution.
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Each innovation results in an intermediate good of higher quality. Specically, a new
innovation multiplies the productivity parameter Ak by  > 1; so that
Ak+1 = Ak:
Innovations in turn arrive discretely with Poisson rate z, where z is the current ow of
research.
In steady state the allocation of labor between research and manufacturing remains constant
over time, and is determined by the research arbitrage equation
!k = vk (27)
where the LHS of (27) is the productivity-adjusted wage !k  wk=Ak; which a worker earns by
working in the manufacturing sector; vk  Vk=Ak is the productivity-adjusted value and vk
is the expected reward from investing one unit ow of labor in research.22 The productivity-
adjusted value vk of an innovation is in turn determined by the Bellman equation
vk = e(!k)  zvk (28)
where  (!k) = Ak [1  ]
1+
1 !

 1
k is the equilibrium prot and e(!k)   (!k) =Ak denotes
the productivity-adjusted ow of monopoly prots accruing to a successful innovator and we
used the fact that rt = . In (28) the term ( zv) corresponds to the capital loss involved in
being replaced by a subsequent innovator. In steady state, the productivity-adjusted variables
!k and vk remain constant, therefore the subscript k will henceforth be dropped.
The above arbitrage equation, which can now be reexpressed as
! = 
e(!)
+ z
;
together with the labor-market clearing condition
y(!) + z = L
where y(!) is the manufacturing demand for labor, jointly determine the steady-state amount
of research z as a function of the parameters ; ; L; ; :
In a steady-state the ow of nal good produced between the kth and (k + 1)th innovation
is
Yk = Ak [L  z] :
Thus the log of nal output increases by ln  each time a new innovation occurs. Then the
average growth rate of the economy is equal to the size of each step ln  times the average
number of innovations per unit of time, z : i.e.
E (g) = z ln 
22Equation (27) is just a rewrite of equation (R) in Section 2: recall that the latter is expressed as
wk = Vk+1;
using the fact that Vk+1 = Vk; this immediately leads to equation (27).
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Note that this is a one-sector economy where each innovation corresponds by denition to
a major technological change (i.e., to the arrival of a new GPT), and thus where growth is
uneven with the time path of output being a random step function. But although it is uneven,
the time path of aggregate output does not involve any slump. Accounting for the existence of
slumps requires an extension of the basic Schumpeterian model, which brings us to the GPT
growth model.
6.2 A model of growth with GPTs
As before, there are L workers who can engage either in production of existing intermediate
goods or in research aimed at discovering new intermediate goods. Again, each intermediate
good is linked to a particular GPT. We follow Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998) in supposing
that before any of the intermediate goods associated with a GPT can be used protably in the
nal-goods sector, some minimal number of them must be available. We lose nothing essential
by supposing that this minimal number is one. Once the good has been invented, its discoverer
prots from a patent on its exclusive use in production, exactly as in the basic Schumpeterian
model reviewed earlier.
Thus the di¤erence between this model and our basic model is that now the discovery of a
new generation of intermediate goods comes in two stages. First a new GPT must come, and
then the intermediate good must be invented that implements that GPT. Neither can come
before the other. You need to see the GPT before knowing what sort of good will implement it,
and people need to see the previous GPT in action before anyone can think of a new one. For
simplicity we assume that no one directs R&D toward the discovery of a new GPT. Instead,
the discovery arrives as a serendipitous by-product of learning by doing with the previous one.
Figure 10: Phases of GPT Cycles
The economy will pass through a sequence of cycles, each having two phases, as indicated
in Figure 10. GPTi arrives at time Ti. At that time the economy enters phase 1 of the ith
cycle. During phase 1, the amount z of labor is devoted to research. Phase 2 begins at time
Ti +i when this research discovers an intermediate good to implement GPTi. During phase
2 all labor is allocated to manufacturing until GPTi+1 arrives, at which time the next cycle
begins. Over the cycle, output is equal to Ai 1F (L  z) during phase 1 and to AiF (L) during
phase 2. Thus the drawing of labor out of manufacturing and into research causes output to
fall each time a GPT is discovered, by an amount equal to Ai 1[F (L)  F (L  z)]:
A steady-state equilibrium is one in which people choose to do the same amount of research
each time the economy is in phase 1; that is, z is constant from one GPT to the next. As before,
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we can solve for the equilibrium value of z using a research-arbitrage equation and a labor-
market-equilibrium condition. Let !j be the (productivity-adjusted) wage , and vj the expected
(productivity-adjusted) present value of the incumbent (intermediate good) monopolist when
the economy is in phase j 2 f1; 2g : In a steady state these productivity-adjusted variables will
all be independent of which GPT is currently in use.
Because research is conducted in phase 1 but pays o¤when the economy enters into phase 2
with a productivity parameter raised by the factor , the following research-arbitrage condition
must hold in order for there to be a positive level of research in the economy
!1 = v2:
Suppose that once we are in phase 2, the new GPT is delivered by a Poisson process with
constant arrival rate . Then the value v2 is determined by the Bellman equation
v2 = e(!2) +  [v1   v2] :
By analogous reasoning, we have:
v1 = e(!1)  zv1:
Combining the above three equations, yields the research arbitrage equation:
!1 =

+ 
e(!2) + e(!1)
+ z

: (29)
Because no one does research in phase 2, we know that the value of !2 is determined indepen-
dently of research, by the market-clearing condition
L = y(!2):
Thus we can take this value as given and regard the preceding research-arbitrage condition
(29) as determining !1 as a function of z: The value of z is then determined, as in the previous
subsection, by the labor-market equation
L  z = y(!1)
.
The average growth rate will be the frequency of innovations times the size ln , for exactly
the same reason as in the basic model. The frequency, however, is determined a little di¤erently
than before because the economy must pass through two phases. An innovation is implemented
each time a full cycle is completed. The frequency with which this implementation occurs is
the inverse of the expected length of a complete cycle. This in turn is just the expected length
of phase 1 plus the expected length of phase 2: 1=z + 1= = [+ z] =z: Thus the growth
rate will be
g = ln 
z
+ z
which is positively a¤ected by anything that raises research. Note also that growth tapers o¤
in the absence of the arrival of new GPTs, i.e. if  = 0. This leads Gordon (2012) to predict a
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durable slowdown of growth in the US and other developed economies as the ITC revolution
is running out of steam.
The size of the slump ln(F (L))  ln(F (L  z)) that occurs when each GPT arrives is also
an increasing function of z, and hence it will tend to be positively correlated with the average
growth rate.
One further property of this cycle worth mentioning is that the wage rate will rise when the
economy goes into a slump. That is, because there is no research in phase 2, the normalized
wage must be low enough to provide employment for all L workers in the manufacturing sector,
whereas with the arrival of the new GPT the wage must rise to induce manufacturers to release
workers into research. This brings us directly to the next subsection on wage inequality.
6.3 GPT and wage inequality
In this subsection we show how the model of the previous section can account for the rise in
the skill premium during the IT revolution. We modify that model by assuming that there
are two types of labor. Educated labor can work in both research and manufacturing, whereas
uneducated labor can only work in manufacturing. Let Ls and Lu denote the supply of educated
(skilled) and uneducated (unskilled) labor, let !s1 and !
u
1 denote their respective productivity-
adjusted wages in phase 1 of the cycle (when research activities on complementary inputs
actually take place), and let !2 denote the productivity-adjusted wage of labor in phase 2 (when
new GPTs have not yet appeared and therefore labor is entirely allocated to manufacturing).
If in equilibrium the labor market is segmented in phase 1, with all skilled labor being
employed in research while unskilled workers are employed in manufacturing, we have the
labor-market-clearing conditions
Ls = z; Lu = y(!u1); and L
s + Lu = y(!2)
and the research-arbitrage condition
!s1 = v2 (30)
where v2 is the productivity-adjusted value of an intermediate producer in stage 2. This value
is itself determined as before by the two Bellman equations:
v2 = e(!2) +  [v1   v2]
and:
v1 = e(!u1)  zv1:
Thus the above research-arbitrage equation (30) expresses the wage of skilled labor as being
equal to the expected value of investing (skilled) labor in R&D for discovering complementary
inputs to the new GPT.
The labor market will be truly segmented in phase 1 if and only if !s1 dened by research-
arbitrage condition (30) satises:
!s1 > !
u
1
which in turn requires that Ls not be too large. Otherwise the labor market remains unseg-
mented, with z < Ls and
!s1 = !
u
1
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in equilibrium. In the former case, the arrival of a new GPT raises the skill premium (from 0
to !s1=!
u
1  1) at the same time as it produces a productivity slowdown because labor is driven
out of production.
6.4 Predictions
The above GPT model delivers the following predictions.23
Prediction 1: The di¤usion of a new GPT is associated with an increase in the ow of
rm entry and exit.
This results from the fact that the GPT is Schumpeterian in nature, thus generates quality-
improving innovations, and therefore creative destruction, in numerous sectors of the economy
as it di¤uses to those sectors. It also explains the observed surge of nancial sectors during
the acceleration phase in the di¤usion of new GPTs, as shown by Philippon (2008).
Prediction 2: The arrival of a new GPT generates a slowdown in productivity growth;
this slowdown is mirrored by a decline in stock market prices.
The di¤usion of a new GPT requires complementary inputs and learning, which may draw
resources from normal production activities and may contribute to future productivity in a
way that cannot be captured easily by current statistical indicators. Another reason why the
di¤usion of a new GPT should reduce growth in the short run is by inducing obsolescence of
existing capital in the sectors it di¤uses to (see Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2009)).
Prediction 3: The di¤usion of a new GPT generates an increase in wage inequality both
between and within educational groups.
An increase in the skill premium occurs as more skilled labor is required to di¤use a new
GPT to all the sectors of the economy as we saw above. The other and perhaps most intriguing
feature of the upsurge in wage inequality is that it took place to a large extent within control
groups, no matter how narrowly those groups are identied (e.g., in terms of experience, ed-
ucation, gender, industry, occupation). One explanation is that skill-biased technical change
enhanced not only the demand for observed skills as described earlier but also the demand for
unobserved skills or abilities. Although theoretically appealing, this explanation is at odds with
econometric work (Blundell and Preston (1999)) showing that the within-group component of
wage inequality in the United States and United Kingdom is mainly transitory, whereas the
between-group component accounts for most of the observed increase in the variance of per-
manent income. The explanation based on unobserved innate abilities also fails to explain why
the rise in within-group inequality has been accompanied by a corresponding rise in individual
wage instability (see Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt (1994)). Using a GPT approach, Aghion, Howitt,
and Violante (2002) argue that the di¤usion of a new technological paradigm can a¤ect the
evolution of within-group wage inequality in a way that is consistent with these facts. The
di¤usion of a new GPT raises within-group wage inequality primarily because the rise in the
speed of embodied technical progress associated with the di¤usion of the new GPT increases
the market premium to those workers who adapt quickly to the leading-edge technology and
are therefore able to survive the process of creative destruction at work as the GPT di¤uses
23While Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) provide evidence for the rst three prediction, we refer the reader to
Acemoglu (2002; 2009), Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999), and Aghion and Howitt (2009) for evidence
on growth and wage inequality. In particular Aghion and Howitt contrast the GPT explanation with alternative
explanations based on trade, deunionization, or directed technical change considerations.
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to the various sectors of the economy.24
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we argued that Schumpeterian growth theory - where current innovators exert
positive knowledge spillovers on subsequent innovators as in other innovation-based models,
but where current innovators also drive out previous technologies-, generates predictions and
explains facts about the growth process that could not be accounted for by other theories.
In particular, we saw how Schumpeterian growth theory manages to put IO into growth,
and to link growth with rm dynamics, thereby generating predictions on the dynamic patterns
of markets and rms (entry, exit, reallocation,..) and on how these patterns shape the overall
growth process. These predictions and the underlying models can be confronted to micro data
and this confrontation in turn helps rene the models. This back-and-forth communication
between theory and data has been key to the development of the Schumpeterian growth theory
over the past 25 years.25
Also, we argued that Schumpeterian growth theory helps us reconcile growth with develop-
ment, in particular by bringing out the notion of appropriate growth institutions and policies,
i.e. the idea that what drives growth in a sector (or country) far below the world technol-
ogy frontier, is not necessarily what drives growth in a sector or country at the technological
frontier where creative destruction plays a more important role. In particular we pointed to
democracy being more-growth enhancing in more frontier economies. The combination of the
creative destruction and appropriate growth institutions ideas also underlies the view26 that
"extractive economies" where creative destruction is deterred by political elites, are more likely
to fall in low-growth traps.
Beyond enhancing our understanding of the growth process, Schumpeterian growth theory
is useful in at least two respects. First, as a tool for growth policy design: departing from the
"Washington consensus" view whereby the same policies should be recommended everywhere,
the theory points to appropriate growth policies, i.e. policies that match the particular context
of a country or region. Thus we saw that more intense competition (lower entry barriers), a
24 In terms of the preceding model, let us again assume that all workers have the same level of education but
that once a new GPT has been discovered, only a fraction  of the total labor force can adapt quickly enough
to the new technology so that they can work on looking for a new component that complements the GPT. The
other workers that did not successfully adapt have no alternative but to work in manufacturing. Let !adapt1
denote the productivity-adjusted wage rate of adaptable workers in phase 1 of the cycle, whereas !1 denotes the
wage of nonadaptable workers. Labor market clearing implies: L = z; [1  ]L = y(!1); L = y(!2) whereas
research arbitrage for adaptable workers in phase 1 implies !adapt1 = v2: When  is su¢ ciently small the
model generates a positive adaptability premium: !adapt1 > !1:
25For example, when analyzing the relationship between growth and rm dynamics, this back-and-forth
process amounts to what one might call a layered approach. Here we refer the reader to Daron Acemoglus panel
discussion at the Nobel Symposium on Growth and Development (September 2012). The idea here is that of a
"step-by-step" estimation method where at each step a small subset of parameters are being identied in their
neighborhood. Thanks to the rich set of available micro data, one can rst identify a parameter and its partial
equilibrium e¤ect as well as some of its industry equilibrium e¤ects. Next, one can test the predictions of the
model using moments in the data that were not directly targeted in the original estimation. Then one can check
that the model also satises various out of sample properties and reach to a macro aggregation by building on
detailed micro moments. Schumpeterian models are well suited for this type of approach as they are able to
generate realistic rm dynamics with tractable aggregations.
26See Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).
35
higher degree of trade openness, more emphasis on research education, all of these are more
growth-enhancing in more frontier countries.27
The Schumpeterian growth paradigm also helps assess the relative magnitude of counteract-
ing partial equilibrium e¤ects pointed out by the theoretical IO literature. For example there
is a whole literature on competition, investments and incentives28, which points at counter-
acting partial equilibrium e¤ects without saying much as to when one particular e¤ect should
be expected to prevail. In contrast, Section 3 illustrated how aggregation and the resulting
composition e¤ect could help determine under which circumstances the escape competition
e¤ect would dominate the counteracting Schumpeterian e¤ect. Similarly, Section 4 showed
the importance of reallocation for growth: thus policies supporting entry or incumbent R&D
could contribute positively to economic growth in partial equilibrium, yet general equilibrium
showed that this is done at the expense of reduced innovation by the rest of the economy.
Where do we see the Schumpeterian growth agenda being pushed over the next years?
A rst direction is to look more closely at how growth and innovation are a¤ected by the
organization of rms and research. Thus over the past ve years Nick Bloom and John Van
Reenen have popularized fascinating new data sets that allow us to look at how various types of
organizations (e.g. more or less decentralized rms) are more or less conducive to innovation.
But rmssize and organization are in turn endogenous, and in particular they depend upon
factors such as the relative supply of skilled labor or the nature of domestic institutions.
A second and related avenue for future research is to look at growth, rm dynamics and
reallocation in developing economies. Recent empirical evidence (see Hsieh and Klenow 2009,
2012) has shown that misallocation of resources is a major source of productivity gap across
countries. What are the causes of misallocation, why do these countries lack creative destruc-
tion which would eliminate the ine¢ cient rms? Schumpeterian theory with rm dynamics
could be an invaluable source to shed light on these important issues that lie at the core of the
development puzzle.
A third avenue is to look at the role of nance in the growth process. In Section 5 we
pointed at equity nance being more growth-enhancing in more frontier economies. More
generally, we still need to better understand how di¤erent types of nancial instruments map
with di¤erent sources of growth and di¤erent types of innovation activities. Also, we need
to better understand why we observe a surge of nance during the acceleration phase in the
di¤usion of new technological waves, as mentioned in Section 6, and also how nancial sectors
evolve when the waves taper o¤. These and many other microeconomic aspects of innovation
and growth await further research.
27Parallel studies point at labor market liberalization and stock market nance being more growth-enhancing
in more advanced countries or regions.
28See the recent analytical surveys by Gilbert (2006), Vives (2008), and Schmutzler (2010).
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